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The Constitutionality of High School 
Graduation Prayers Under 
Harris v. School District No. 241 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The propriety of prayer in public life has always been a 
difficult issue for the Court. The Founding Fathers separat-
ed church and state via Establishment Clause. 1 Ironically, 
the same week the Establishment Clause passed, the Found-
ing Fathers voted to begin each of their Congressional ses-
sions with prayer.2 The exact boundaries of the church-state 
divide were left undefined. Today, courts still puzzle over 
where to draw these boundaries, especially in the area of 
public prayer. As our society has become more cosmopolitan, 
the conflict between religion and government has increased 
and line drawing has become even more difficult and com-
plex. 
High school graduation prayers were supposed unconsti-
tutional after Lee v. Weisman. 3 However, Weisman did not 
address all of the issues, and graduation prayers are still 
permissible in some circuits. Through its analysis of Harris 
v. School District No. 241, this Note, in four parts, considers 
some of the unaddressed issues. Part II reviews the history 
of school and graduation prayers leading to Weisman. Part 
III summarizes the background for Harris. Part IV analyzes 
Harris under three tests still valid in a post-Weisman era. 
Part V concludes that under certain circumstances gradua-
tion prayers are still constitutionally permissible. 
II. THE HISTORY OF GRADUATION PRAYERS 
A. The Early Cases 
Controversy over high school graduation prayers began 
in the early 1970s.4 From 1972 to 1974 three cases were 
1 U.S. CONST. amend I. 
2 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984). 
3 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992); see, e.g., Griffith v. Teran, 807 F. Supp. 107, 108 
(1991) (parties agreeing that a pre-Weisman decision denying a motion to enjoin 
school district from holding graduation prayers was rendered invalid by Weisman). 
4 These cases were probably inspired by the classroom prayer cases. The 
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decided. 5 In each case, the lower courts upheld the practice 
of graduation prayers.6 These early cases provided five ar-
guments which have recurred in later cases.7 First, it may 
be argued that offensive effects of graduation prayer can be 
mitigated by making graduation attendance voluntary.8 One 
court buttressed this argument by pointing out that partici-
pation in the prayer may be voluntary as well. 9 Implicit in 
this argument is that attendance by the student is consent 
to the prayer. 
Second, it may be argued that the state is subsidizing a 
religious activity if the graduation ceremony is paid for by 
tax monies. 10 In Wood v. Mt. Lebanon Township School 
District, the court dismissed this claim as de minimis, 11 
holding that prayers are such a brief part of the ceremony 
that no monetary harm results from the time consumed by 
invocation and benediction. 12 In Grossberg v. Deusebio, the 
court took a different approach in considering the tax mon-
ies issue. The court weighed the use of student funds for 
the prayer against any state funds used to pay for gradua-
tion ceremonies. 13 
Third, it may be argued that the length of prayer may 
be weighed when determining whether Establishment Clause 
infringements have occurred. Along these lines, courts have 
Court held classroom prayers unconstitutional. See, e.g., Abington Sch. Dist. v. 
Schempp. 374 U.S. 203, 229 (1963) (beginning the public school day by reading, 
without comment, from the Bible violated the Establishment Clause); Engel v. 
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (beginning the public school day with prayer violated 
the Establishment Clause because prayers were solely religious in nature and they 
advance a religious cause through the government); see also Thomas A. Schweitzer, 
Lee v. Weisman and the Establishment Clause: Are Invocations and Benedictions at 
Public School Graduations Constitutionally Unspeakable?, 69 U. DET. MERCY L. 
REV. 113, 124 (1992). 
5 Weist v. Mt. Lebanon Sch. Dist., 320 A.2d 362 (1974), cert. denied, 419 
U.S. 967 (1974); Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp 285 (E.D. Va. 1974); Wood v. 
Mt. Lebanon Township Sch. Dist., 342 F. Supp. 1293 (1972). 
6 ld. 
7 Grossberg is the most legally developed of these early cases. It addresses 
all four of the factual arguments used by the early cases in upholding graduation 
prayer. 
8 Grossberg, 380 F. Supp. at 287; Wood, 342 F. Supp. at 1294; Weist, 320 
A.2d at 364-65 (justifying graduation prayer on the sole grounds that graduation 
ceremonies are voluntary). 
9 Grossberg, 380 F. Supp. at 290. 
10 Wood, 342 F. Supp. at 1295. 
11 ld .. 
12 ld. 
13 Grossberg, 380 F. Supp. at 287. 
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reasoned that the prayer would "be brief, transient and 
subsumed in the secular degree awarding ceremony."14 
Fourth, it may be argued that some overlap between 
religion and government is inevitable and that, for this rea-
son, not every expression of religion in public life violates 
the Establishment Clause.15 Along this line of reasoning, it 
has been suggested that courts are incapable of enjoining 
every technical infringement of the First Amendment. 16 Ab-
solute separation would be impossible since government and 
religion must interactY The government's role is one of 
neutrality. 18 It should neither inhibit nor encourage, but 
rather should permit personal choices free from state com-
pulsion.19 
Fifth, it may be argued that, if the graduating class 
through its class representatives decided to have the 
graduation prayer, no First Amendment violation oc-
curred.20 Courts have rejected this line of argument as a 
"symbolic washing of hands."21 It reasoned that a "gradua-
tion ceremony for a public school class, held on public 
school grounds, and administered by public school personnel, 
at which diplomas are officially awarded by the adminis-
tration, is a public school event."22 The court, however, 
held that any infringements were outweighed by voluntary 
14 ld. at 291. 
15 ld. at 289. 
16 Weist v. Mt. Lebanon Sch. Dist., 320 A.2d 362, 365 (Penn.), cert. denied, 
419 U.S. 967 (1974) (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-313 (1952). 
(Douglas, J.). Justice Douglas's majority opinion stated that: 
Prayers in our legislative halls; the appeals to the Almighty in the mes-
sages of the Chief Executive; the proclamations making Thanksgiving Day 
a holiday; "so help me God" in our courtroom oaths-these and all other 
references to the Almighty that run through our laws, our public rituals, 
our ceremonies would be flouting the First Amendment. A fastidious athe-
ist or agnostic could even object to the supplication with which the Court 
opens each session: "God save the United States and this Honorable 
Court"). 
17 Grossberg, 380 F. Supp. at 290. 
18 ld. 
19 ld. (using neutrality reasoning in response to a free exercise argument 
raised in addition to an Establishment Clause infringement argument). 
20 ld. at 287. 
21 ld. at 288. 
22 ld. But see Harris v. School Dist. No. 241, 821 F. Supp. 638, 643 (D. 
Idaho 1993). 
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attendance, the short duration of the prayer, and the over-
lap of religion into public life.23 
Although these early cases cite to Supreme Court cases, 
they do not follow any test created by the Court. This is 
ironic since Lenwn v. Kurtzman was decided almost a year 
before the first of these cases. 24 Grossberg comes the clos-
est to following the Supreme Court by correctly recognizing 
the fact sensitivity of the Establishment Clause and the 
need to strike the proper balance.25 Conversely, the later 
cases rely much more heavily on Supreme Court promulgat-
ed tests.26 
B. The Later Cases 
After the initial surge of cases in the early 1970s, no 
cases focused exclusively on high school graduation prayer 
until Stein v. Plainwell Community School27 and Graham 
v. Central Community School District of Decatur28 were 
decided in 1985.29 Including these two cases, eight gradua-
23 Grossberg, 380 F. Supp. at 290. 
24 Id. 
25 ld. at 289 ("The duty of the courts is to strike the proper balance. The 
area is a sensitive one, involving questions of degree." (quoting Allen v. Hickel, 424 
F.2d 944, 949 (1970)); cf Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2661 (1992). 
26 Essentially two tests have been used in later cases: the three-prong Lem-
on test and the historical tradition test. The most prevalent test is Lemon. Every 
graduation prayer case after Grossberg uses this test somewhere in its analysis. 
This three-prong test requires that a governmental practice: (1) reflect a clearly 
secular purpose; (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits reli-
gion; and (3) avoids excessive government entanglement with religion. See Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). However, Lemon has been extensively 
criticized by scholars, practitioners, and members of the Court. Lamb's Chapel v. 
Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2149 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment) ("As to the Court's invocation of the Lemon test: Like 
some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and 
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school 
attorneys .... "); Lee v. Weisman, 112 S.Ct. 2649, 2655 (1992) (United States 
Attorney General in an amicus and the petitioner both advocate overturning Lem-
on); Rex E. Lee, The Religion Clauses: Problems and Prospects, 1986 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 337, 340-42 (1986). While many feel the Lemon test is unworkable, the Court 
has not seen fit to overrule it directly. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2655. 
The second test is the historical-tradition test. See Marsh v. Chambers, 103 
S.Ct. 3330, 3333 (1983) (upholding Nebraska's practice of beginning each legislative 
session with prayer since the practice is "deeply embedded in the history and tra-
dition of this country"). In Weisman, the Court held this test was not applicable to 
graduation invocations and benedictions. 
27 610 F. Supp. 43 (W.D. Mich. 1985), rev'd, 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987). 
28 608 F. Supp. 531 (S.D. Iowa 1985). 
29 From 1974 to 1985, several school prayer cases were decided, but none of 
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tion prayer cases were decided between 1985 and 1991.30 
All eight cases used the Lemon test as part of their analy-
sis. But the presence of other tests and the difficulty of 
applying the Lemon test led to a different result. This Note 
will center on the five cases decided in federal court.31 
These five cases were split almost evenly on whether gradu-
ation prayers were constitutional. Jones II and Albright held 
graduation prayers did not violate the Establishment Clause, 
whereas, Graham and Lundberg held the inverse. Paradoxi-
cally, Stein held that the invocations and benedictions vio-
lated the Establishment Clause, but then the court defined 
under what circumstances such prayers would be acceptable. 
these cases exclusively focused on high school graduation prayers. Given the fact 
sensitivity of Establishment Clause issues those cases are not discussed in this 
Note. See, e.g., Florey v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist., 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1980) 
(holding that the school district's policy permitting observance of holidays having 
both secular and religious bases did not violate the Establishment Clause under 
the Lemon test); Doe v. Aldine Indep. Sch. Dist., 563 F. Supp. 883 (S.D. Tex. 1982) 
(holding that the practice of prayers and the singing of the school song, which 
referred to deity at high school assemblies and athletic contests failed all three 
prongs of the Lemon test). 
In Florey, the school district policy was upheld by the court, which included, 
inter alia, invocations and benedictions at high school graduation. However, the 
court never analyzed these prayers separately. See Florey, 619 F.2d at 1320. The 
court's analysis focused on whether or not school Christmas programs violated the 
Establishment Clause. 
Note that Doe is distinguishable from the graduation prayer issues since the 
court focused on the activities that took place during regular school hours. Any 
comparison to high school prayer would be overruled by Jones v. Clear Creek 
lndep. Sch. Dist, 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993). 
See also Schweitzer, supra note 4, at 124 n.50. 
30 Jones v. Clear Creek lndep. Sch. Dist. 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. 
granted, 112 S. Ct. 3020, reh'g denied, 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 
113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993); Stein v. Plainwell Community Sch., 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 
1987); Albright v. Bd. of Educ. of Granite Sch. Dist., 765 F. Supp. 682, 684 (D. 
Utah 1991); Lundberg v. West Monona Community Sch. Dist., 731 F. Supp. 331 
(N.D. Iowa 1989); Graham v. Central Community Sch. Dist. of Decatur, 608 F. 
Supp. 531 (S.D. Iowa 1985); Sands v. Mooring Unified Sch. Dist., 809 P.2d 809 
(Cal. 1991); Bennett v. Livermore Unified Sch. Dist., 238 Cal. Rptr. 819 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1987); Kay v. David Douglas Sch. Dist. No. 40, 719 P.2d 875 (Or. App. 1986). 
31 State constitutions can be more restrictive than the U.S. Constitution. For 
this reason, it is difficult to compare these cases to federal cases. In states with 
constitutions more restrictive than the U.S. Constitution, state jurisprudence is con-
trolling-federal jurisprudence is persuasive only. However, state constitutions can-
not be less restrictive than the U.S. Constitution because of the Supremacy Clause. 
U.S. CONST. art. VI. But many of the arguments in these state cases track those 
made in federal cases. These three state cases invalidated school graduation 
prayer. Sands v. Mooring Unified Sch. Dist., 809 P.2d 809 (Cal. 1991); Bennett v. 
Livermore Unified Sch. Dist., 238 Cal. Rptr. 819 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Kay v. Da-
vid Douglas Sch. Dist. No. 40, 719 P.2d 875 (Or. App. 1986). 
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1. Stein v. Plainwell Community School 
In Stein, two school districts allowed prayer at gradua-
tion. One district had prayers given by students while the 
other had prayers given by clergy. As in the early cases, 
the school district argued that prayer should be upheld 
since attendance at graduation was voluntary. The school 
district also tried to distinguish classroom prayer from grad-
uation prayer by emphasizing the infrequency of graduation 
prayers. 
Stein took a novel approach to the issue. 32 Stein up-
held the idea of graduation prayer under the "history and 
tradition" test in Marsh v. Chambers.33 However, Stein con-
cerned itself with the contents of prayers, prohibiting prayer 
that would be tantamount to saying to "parents and stu-
dents: we do not recognize your religious beliefs, our beliefs 
are superior to yours."34 Importantly, the court in Stein 
went on to find that the content of the prayers in question 
were unacceptable under Marsh. 
In addition to its content-oriented approach, Stein also 
presents a new approach not seen in the early cases. 
Separationists argue that graduation prayer indoctrinates 
and proselytes students. The court resolves this concern by 
reference to parental attendance at graduation, which atten-
dance shields students from religious coercion. 35 
32 Before considering its novel approach, the court first goes through all 
three prongs of the Lemon test and finds that graduation prayer passes all three 
prongs. Stein, 822 F.2d at 1407-08. 
33 103 S.Ct. 3330, 3333 (1983) (applying the history and tradition test pro-
mulgated in Marsh u. Chambers to the graduation prayer issue for the first time). 
34 Stein, 822 F.2d at 1410. Stein's approach to deciding the validity of school 
prayer based on content of the prayer has been criticized for two reasons. First, 
courts should not focus on whether the prayer contains religious words, but on 
whether the prayer itself is constitutionally permissible. ld. at 1411-12 (Wellford, 
J., dissenting). Second, prohibiting controversial speech before it is spoken is a 
prior restraint. Id.; see also Ken Jorgensen, Making Prior Restraint an Enforcement 
Tool of the Establishment Clause: Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools, 1989 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 305-17 (1989). 
35 Stein, 822 F.2d at 1409. 
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2. Upholding graduation prayer 
Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District36 is 
one of the leading cases on school prayer and represents the 
current rule in the Fifth Circuit. In Jones II, the traditional 
graduation invocations and benedictions were challenged 
since they contained overt Christian references.37 The court 
used the Lemon test to analyze the case. The court found 
that the secular purpose prong was satisfied, since prayer 
can be used to solemnize an event.38 The court used the 
arguments of early cases to pass the primary effects test: 
the prayers were brief, students only experienced the prayer 
once in four years, and the parents' presence decreased the 
impact of coercion by peers or school officials.39 Finally, no 
excessive entanglement was found since students offered the 
prayers, not clergy.40 Having met all three prongs of the 
Lemon test, the court held the school's practice of having 
prayers at graduation constitutional.41 
Although Albright v. Board of Education of Granite 
School District42 also found that graduation prayer satisfied 
the Lemon test, one significant facial difference distin-
guished it from Jones II, Stein, or any of the earlier cases. 
School officials did not "control, regulate or preapprove [sic] 
the content of speech or expression by any participant."43 
Students were counseled to speak in terms that represent 
and respect diverse views.44 Conversely, Jones II required 
some sort of monitoring to ensure prayers were non-prosely-
tizing in content.45 
In Albright, the school had no "police power" to ensure 
prayers were not proselytizing, since they could not monitor 
content. Students were encouraged to be sensitive to others' 
36 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 3020, reh'g denied, 
977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993) [hereinafter 
Jones ll]. 
37 ld. 
38 ld. at 422. 
39 Id. 
40 ld. (noting that the school district did not decide who gave the prayer, 
but it did pre-screen prayers for "sectarianism and proselytization"). 
41 ld. 
42 765 F. Supp. 682, 684 (D. Utah 1991). 
43 ld. 
44 ld. 
45 Jones, 977 F.2d at 964 n.l. 
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beliefs, and the school officials and district played a com-
pletely neutral role.46 
3. Graduation prayer held unconstitutional 
In Graham v. Central Community School District of 
Decatur47 , the district had Christian ministers give invoca-
tions and benedictions at high school graduation for over 
twenty years. The school board decided to continue the 
practice despite the plaintiffs grievances that the practice 
personally offended him. 
Eventually, these graduation prayers were held unconsti-
tutional on grounds that they failed the secular purpose 
prong and the primary effects prong of Lemon: "the invoca-
tion and benediction portions of the defendant's commence-
ment exercises serve a Christian religious purpose, not a 
secular purpose."48 This conclusion is "supported not only 
by the great weight of the evidence ... but by the undeni-
able truth that prayer is inherently religious."49 Invocations 
and benedictions were held to have the primary effect of 
advancing the Christian religion. 50 In Graham, the court 
never reached the excessive entanglement prong because its 
rulings on the first two prongs were dispositive.51 
46 The school board policy did not require benedictions or invocations, and 
the students had substantial input into the program. Albright, 765 F. Supp. at 
684-85 n.4. 
47 608 F. Supp. 531, 532-36 (D. Iowa 1985). 
48 ld. at 535. 
49 ld.; see id. at 535-36 (further quoting Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897 
(5th Cir. 1981), affd, 455 U.S. 913 (1982), which held that 
[p]rayer is perhaps the quintessential religious practice for many of the 
world's faiths, and it plays a significant role in the devotional lives of 
most religious people . . . . [it) is an address of entreaty, supplication, 
praise, or thanksgiving directed to some sacred or divine spirit, being, or 
object .... [t]hat it may contemplate some wholly secular objective cannot 
alter the inherently religious character of the exercise). 
50 Graham, 608 F. Supp. at 536. The court never points to which facts in 
the case it uses to draw this conclusion. Rather, it draws a legal conclusion by 
comparing the case in question to Hall v. Bradshaw, 630 F.2d 1018, 1020-21 (4th 
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981). Hall, after analyzing printed prayers 
on official state maps, held that "a prayer, because it is religious, does advance 
religion, and the limited nature of the encroachment does not free the state from 
the limitations of the Establishment Clause." Id. 
51 Graham, 608 F. Supp. at 536. 
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Mter finding that the Lemon test had not been met, the 
court in Graham considered other miscellaneous arguments 
to buttress its conclusion. First, it rejected the school 
board's use of Lynch, since that case "did not involve any 
religious exercise like prayer at a public government func-
tion."52 The court placed great importance on the distinc-
tion between public prayer and Christmas displays. Second, 
the court criticized the early cases for placing too much 
emphasis on voluntary attendance at graduation.53 Finally, 
when the school board tried to compare its prayers to those 
upheld in Marsh,54 the court distinguished the two cases. 
The court considered the Marsh decision as "a singular 
Establishment Clause decision that rests on the 'unique 
history' of legislative prayer, and the holding of that case is 
clearly limited to the legislative setting."55 
The facts in Lundberg v. West Monona Community 
School District are different from other graduation prayer 
cases.56 The school board voted against including high 
school graduation invocations and benedictions. 57 The plain-
tiff, an ordained minister who was going to give the gradua-
tion prayer, sued to force the school district to reverse its 
decision. 58 The court held that the practice of permitting 
graduation prayers failed two prongs of Lemon for reasons 
similar to Graham. 59 
Lundberg adds two new arguments to the cumulative 
graduation prayer jurisprudence. First, methods other than 
prayer can be used to solemnize graduations.60 This argu-
ment implies that the least offensive means should be used 
to solemnize graduations.61 For example, a song or reading 
Shakespeare. 62 
52 !d. 
53 !d. at 536-37. 
54 !d. at 535. 
55 !d. at 535. The court reasons that Lerrwn is used both before and after 
Marsh, which illustrates its post-Marsh viability. 
56 731 F. Supp. 331 (N.D. Iowa 1989). 
57 !d. at 334-35. The primary motive for the vote was the risk of personal 
liability from possible suits brought under the Establishment Clause. 
58 !d. 
59 !d. at 341-47. The excessive entanglement prong was not analyzed be-
cause it was not argued. 
60 ld. at 342-43. 
61 ld. 
62 ld. 
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Second, the court presents a test to deal with conflicts 
between constitutional rights. A balancing test should be 
used "to maximize . . . the overall measure of the funda-
mental rights created by the framers, by deciding which 
course of action will lead to the lesser deprivation of those 
rights."63 In this case, the free speech right to have prayer 
must be weighed against the possible Establishment Clause 
infringements. 64 The court held that the school board's 
right to ban prayers and the Establishment Clause's impact 
on all the graduating seniors who would be forced to listen 
to prayers outweighed the free speech rights of the four 
plaintiffs to hear the prayer. A lesser deprivation of rights 
resulted in banning graduation prayers in this case.65 
C. Summary of Lee v. Weisman 
The split in the lower courts and the mixed applications 
of the Lemon test prompted the Supreme Court to grant 
certiorari to Lee u. Weisman. Many thought that this case 
would rid the courts of the Lemon test and clarify the law 
for graduation prayer cases. 
1. The facts of Weisman 
A middle school principal in Providence asked a local 
rabbi to give the invocation and benediction at gradua-
tion. 66 Principals in Providence, Rhode Island were permit-
ted to invite clergymen to offer invocations and benedictions 
at middle and high school graduation ceremonies. 67 Invited 
clergy were given pamphlets, which contained guidelines for 
public prayers at civic occasions.68 During the ceremony, 
the students sat together, apart from their families. 69 The 
students stood for the Pledge of Allegiance and remained 
standing during the Rabbi's prayer.70 In each instance, the 
63 ld. at 347 (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 
539 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
64 !d. 
65 ld. Under this analysis, the court may have come out the other way if 
the students had voted for invocations and benedictions, since their cumulative 
rights may have outweighed infringements to the plaintiffs. 
66 ld. 
67 Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2652-54 (1992). 
68 ld. 
69 ld. 
70 ld.; cf. Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 821 F. Supp. 638 (D. Idaho 
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prayer was less than a minute in length and attendance at 
the ceremonies was voluntary. 71 
Daniel Weisman, a student's father, brought suit in his 
capacity as a taxpayer and on behalf of his daughter to 
prohibit graduation prayers. 72 In a close decision, the Su-
preme Court held in a five-four decision that the prayers 
violated the Establishment Clause. 
2. Analysis of the Court's holdings 
Weisman promulgated a new Establishment Clause test 
and eliminated several graduation prayer arguments. The 
Court rejected the voluntary attendance, de minimis in-
fringement, and free speech arguments and introduced the 
coercion test. 
Under Weisman, the coercion test has three parts: (1) 
the government directs (2) a formal religious exercise (3) in 
such a way as to obligate the objectors either directly or 
indirectly to participate.73 The Court reasoned that the 
principal, a state official, directed the exercise, since he 
selected who would give the prayer.74 The principal also 
directed the prayer's content by giving the Rabbi guidelines 
for his prayer. 75 The Court's opinion that prayer is a reli-
gious exercise is more conclusory than analytical, and stems 
from the premise that prayers are inherently religious. 76 
Students' coerced participation was comprised of being forced 
1993) (noting that students did not stand and that they were not forced to partici-
pate in any way). 
71 Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2652-54. 
72 ld. 
73 ld. at 2655; see also Westside Community Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 
U.S. 226, 261 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. 
Dist, 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 3020, reh'g denied, 977 
F.2d 963, 970 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993). 
74 Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2655. 
75 Id. at 2656. 
76 ld. Other courts have analyzed the secular and religious purposes of 
prayer. See Lundberg v. West Monona Community Sch. Dist., 731 F. Supp. 331 
(N.D. Iowa 1989); Graham v. Central Community Sch. Dist. of Decatur, 608 F. 
Supp. 531 (S.D. Iowa 1985). Common sense tells us that normally prayer is a 
religious exercise. However, the Court provides no basis, even if it is common 
sense, for determining how they arrived at this conclusion. 
This approach does prevent those advocating prayer from trying to create fic-
tions for justification. It is ironic that under the Lemon test, those seeking invoca-
tions and benedictions at special ceremonies must prove that prayer is secular. See 
infra note 144 and accompanying discussion on duality. 
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to stand during the prayer or at least remain respectfully 
silent.77 
It is worthy to note that this coercion analysis only 
applied to the students and not to the adults present. 78 
The Court does not answer the question of whether the 
rights of "mature adults" would be violated in the same 
circumstances.79 
Given the opportunity to ban all graduation prayers, the 
Court declines. Instead, the Court reiterates the fact-sensi-
tivity of Establishment Clause issues.80 The Court further 
stated, ''We do not hold that every state action implicating 
religion is invalid if one or a few citizens find it offen-
sive."81 With this open door and factual-sensitivity in mind, 
it is important to review what arguments Weisman elimi-
nated since those not eliminated may still be valid. 
First, the Court rejected the voluntary attendance argu-
ment, since "graduation is one of life's most significant occa-
sions."82 The importance of the event is the source of the 
indirect coercion. 83 Individuals who normally would not 
participate in the formal religious exercise of prayer are 
forced to participate or forego attending their own gradua-
tion.84 
Second, the Court refuses to accept that the embarrass-
ment and intrusion caused by prayers is de minimis in 
character.85 The Court rejected this argument by holding 
that time cannot measure the intrusion upon one's funda-
mental rights. 86 
Third, Weisman is factually distinguishable from the 
history and tradition test in Marsh. The Court reasoned 
that 
77 Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2658. 
78 !d. at 2658-59. 
79 !d. 
80 !d. at 2661. 
81 !d. 
82 !d. at 2659. 
83 !d. 
84 !d. 
85 See Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp 285, 291 (E.D. Va. 1974). But see 
Graham v. Central Community Sch. Dist. of Decatur, 608 F. Supp. 531, 533 (S.D. 
Iowa 1985) (rejecting the Grossberg analysis in favor of Graham's analysis). 
86 Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2659. 
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[t)he considerations we have raised in objection to the 
invocation and benediction are in many respects similar to 
the arguments we considered in Marsh. But there are also 
obvious differences. The atmosphere at the op;ming of a 
session of a state legislature where adults are free to en-
ter and leave with little comment and for any number of 
reasons cannot compare with the constraining potential of 
the one school event most important for the student to 
attend. The influence and force of a formal exercise in a 
school graduation are far greater than the prayer exercise 
we condoned in Marsh.87 
Finally, the school argued that prayer is protected under 
the First Amendment as free speech. "[O]ur constitutional 
vision of a free society requires confidence in our own abili-
ty to accept or reject ideas of which we do not appnve, and 
that prayer at a high school graduation does nothing more 
than offer a choice."88 According to the Court, this argu-
ment overlooks fundamental constitutional dynamics.89 Free 
speech envisions full expression even when the government 
participates.90 However, the government should not be a 
prime participant in religious debate and expression. 91 In 
fact, the Establishment Clause was created to prevent such 
interaction.92 There is no equivalent counterpart in free 
speech. 93 The Establishment Clause concern is that what 
might begin as tolerance of religious views may end in in-
doctrination and coercion policies.94 
3. Issues left uncertain 
The Weisman opinion narrowly focused on the specific 
facts of the case. Many questions were not answered. For 
example, what if the students, rather than the school dis-
87 ld. at 2660. 
88 ld. at 2657 (recognizing that, by graduation, high school seniors have 
been exposed to distasteful or immoral ideas). 
89 ld. 
90 ld. Sometimes the very objective of free speech is to persuade the govern-
ment to adopt an idea or course of action. Thus, free speech exchange with the 
government as a participator is essential. 
91 ld. 
92 ld. 
93 ld. 
94 ld. at 2658 (further stating that "a state-created orthodoxy puts at grave 
risk that freedom of belief and conscience which are the sole assurance that reli-
gious faith is real, not imposed"). 
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trict, chose to have a graduation prayer?95 How much in-
fringement on individual rights is caused by the school 
district paying for the facilities where graduation is held 
and where invocations and benedictions are given? Does a 
parent's presence at graduation have any mitigating impact? 
Should the Lemon test apply and how much weight should 
courts give to it in the future? 96 
Ill. BACKGROUND OF HARRIS V. SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 241 
Harris v. School District No. 241 was litigated before 
Lee v. Weisman.97 Although the plaintiffs' and intervenors' 
motions for summary judgment were fully briefed and ar-
gued, the court deferred judgment pending the outcome of 
Weisman. 98 After Weisman the plaintiffs filed to reopen the 
proceedings and conduct further discovery.99 
A. Facts of Harris 
The senior class of Grangerville High School voted by 
written ballot to have an invocation and benediction given 
by a student at their graduation. 100 The school district's 
95 See Albright, 765 F. Supp. at 684. Weisman's ambiguity leaves one to 
wonder about many things. 
96 All five federal cases prior to Weisman applied the Lemon test. Three 
cases passed the test while two failed. However, there are factual differences be-
tween the cases. In both Albright and Jones, students both decided to have prayer 
and offered the prayer; whereas, in Lundberg and Graham, the school district 
decided whether or not to have the prayers. 
97 Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 821 F. Supp. 638 (D. Idaho 1993). 
98 !d. 
99 !d. 
100 Defendant's Statement of Facts 2 (Apr. 23, 1993). The senior class makes 
decisions regarding their graduation program at class meetings. Such decisions are 
made with or without administrators being present. For example, the principal 
Judy Leuck did not attend the first meeting at which the students passed out 
ballots for voting. However, she did attend the second meeting, but did not handle 
any of the business at the meeting. !d. Ballots regarding the prayer issue were, 
however, prepared by the principal and, following the vote, were collected and 
stored by the school administration. Plaintiffs Reply Mem. and Statement of Un-
contested Facts Supp. Summ. J. and Injunctive Relief, at 10 (Apr. 30, 1993) [here-
inafter Reply]. 
Students make decisions by voting and "students tally any ballots passed out 
regarding high school graduation." !d. For example, senior class members decide 
which board members or other persons will present diplomas. Although every ele-
ment of the high school graduation is not "voted on," students can choose to 
change any element of the traditional graduation program. For example, 
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policy is to remain strictly neutral regarding student initi-
ated invocations and benedictions at graduation 
ceremonies. 101 The principal did not pre-approve graduation 
speeches or prayers. However, she did encourage those 
speaking and praying to write down their thoughts in order 
to polish their presentation. 102 The student giving the 
prayers did not give the principal a copy of his text. 103 In 
fact, when giving the prayer, he did not use a text. 104 At 
the graduation, no one was asked to participate in the 
prayers by standing, bowing heads, or removing hats. 105 
Plaintiffs, a mother suing on behalf of herself as a 
taxpayer and her three children who attended school in the 
district, sought injunctive and declaratory relief. 106 A group 
of Grangerville students successfully intervened. These stu-
dents moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the 
school district was neutral, and the students' decision to 
have prayers did not amount to state intervention.107 
the students could decide that no music be played, that the national 
anthem not be played, that there not be a printed program, that there 
not be a speaker, or the students could decide to completely change the 
sequence of graduation and who presents diplomas. The fact that the 
students may not in a given year vote on each and every procedure does 
not in any way affect the senior class students' opportunity to decide 
these issues. 
ld. at 10. 
101 Defendant's Statement of Facts, at 4. This policy has not changed in the 
last 15 years. The superintendent sent a memo to all district principals in Novem-
ber of 1990 to reinforce the policy of neutrality. This memo did not change the 
way graduation was handled at Grangerville High School. The only procedure that 
changed in 1991 was that votes were on written ballots. Previously, they were 
made by straw polls, hand polls, or some other kind of polling of the senior class. 
This procedural change was made due to concern over possible lawsuits. 
102 ld. at 5. But see Reply, at 6 (noting that "Principal Leuck admitted sug-
gesting sensitivity and asking Heath to write his prayers down prior to gradua-
tion . . . . Class president Mike Emerson's recollection is that Leuck wanted to 
review the prayers prior to graduation and Leuck testified that she 'decided not to 
make an issue of it.'"). 
103 ld. Not writing down the prayer and not giving the principal a copy of 
the prayer did not prevent Mr. Heath from giving the invocation or benediction. 
104 Defendant's Supplemental Bd. Opp'n Summ. J., at 14 (Apr. 23, 1993). 
105 Defendant's Statement of Facts, at 5. 
106 Complaint, at 2 (Apr. 11, 1991). 
107 Intervenors' Supplemental Ba. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. (Apr. 8, 1993); see 
also Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 821 F. Supp. 638, 638-40 (D. Idaho 1993). 
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B. The Court's Analysis in Harris 
By focusing on the fact-sensitivity of the Establishment 
Clause issues, Harris upheld graduation prayers under the 
Lemon test. 108 The court was hard pressed to find state 
involvement since the school's involvement did not even 
begin to approach the level of Weisman. 109 Since the stu-
dents were free to decide whether to have prayers, the mere 
presence of faculty and administrators did not constitute 
state involvement. 110 This logic helped to dismiss entangle-
ment problems under Lemon. The court was also reluctant 
to invalidate graduation prayer in light of the decision up-
holding such prayers in Jones II and the Supreme Court's 
hesitation to ban graduation prayers outright in 
Weisman. 111 Besides these arguments, little else is used to 
support the court's opinion. The court also refers to issues 
of whether schools endorsed the prayer, but this concern is 
not sufficiently developed to effectively discuss here. 112 
IV. COMMENTARY ON HARRIS 
This Nate assumes the accuracy of the following four 
premises. First, two distinct tests have come out of the 
Court's ruling in Weisman: the Lemon test and the coercion 
test. 113 However, Weisman emphasized that each Establish-
108 The court never specifically mentions Lemon or the endorsement test in 
its conclusion, but the language used is similar to such tests used in Defendants' 
brief and Jones. 
109 Harris, 821 F. Supp. at 643. 
110 ld. at 643 (quoting Bd. of Education v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990)). 
But see Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp 285 (E.D. Va. 1974). 
111 Harris, 821 F. Supp. at 643. 
112 The endorsement test has never been accepted by a majority of the Court. 
Justice O'Connor first introduced an endorsement test in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 
U.S. 668, 688-89 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (upholding a city's practice of 
owning and displaying a nativity scene during the Christmas season). In Weisman, 
the majority took no opinion on the endorsement test, but the four dissenters 
found no endorsement on the facts of the case. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 
2649, 2683-84 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. 
Sch. Dist, 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 3020, reh'g de-
nied, 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993). Although 
the Harris case mentions endorsement, it is unclear whether it is attempting to 
apply this test. See Harris, 821 F. Supp. at 643. However, if it is applying en-
dorsement, it is probably following the Jones 11 analysis since this test was pro-
posed by the defendant. See Defendant's Supplemental Ba. Opp'n Summ. J., at 14-
16 (Apr. 23, 1993). 
113 Apparently the application of Marsh to graduation prayer did not survive 
Weisman. Although Scalia did not want it so, the majority factually distinguished 
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ment Clause case is fact-sensitive. 114 Thus, neither test is 
controlling, though coercion has current favor. Second, asser-
tion of the arguments specifically rejected in Weisman will 
prove dispositive against the party making the assertion. 
Third, only three graduation prayer cases have been decided 
since Weisman. 115 In addition, Jones II and Harris are suf-
ficiently similar in their facts to justify comparison. 116 
Jones II is also the only post-Weisman appellant decision. 
Fourth, the endorsement test has not been accepted by a 
majority of the Court, so no analysis will be necessary 
here. 117 
A. The Coercion Test 
As previously stated, the coercion test in Weisman re-
quires three prongs to establish coercion: (1) the government 
directs (2) a formal religious exercise (3) in such a way as 
to obligate the objector to participate. 118 
Marsh. 
114 Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2261. 
115 See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist, 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991), 
cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 3020, reh'g denied, 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. 
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993); Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 821 F. Supp. 
638 (D. Idaho 1993); Griffith v. Teran, 807 F. Supp. 107, 108 (1991) (omitting 
Weisman mort). Teran omits the Weisman analysis, perhaps because Teran com-
menced first-Teran was, however, stayed pending the outcome of Weisman. Subse-
quent to the Court's decision in Weisman, the parties to Teran agreed that the 
practices in question violated the Establishment Clause. Thus, there was no subse-
quent analysis to help us in our study. 
116 In Jones II, the students, not the school district, chose to have prayer at 
graduation. A student, not a member of the clergy, was to give the prayer. These 
same two facts were present in Harris. There is one major factual difference be-
tween these two cases. The prayers in Jones II were reviewed by the district to 
ensure that they were nonsectarian. Conversely, in Harris, the school district re-
mained neutral by not monitoring prayer content. While non-monitoring as in Har-
ris increases a school district's neutrality, it also increases the risk of the resulting 
prayer being sectarian or proselytizing. 
117 See supra note 113 and accompanying text. The endorsement test is very 
similar to the primary effects prong of Lemon. Although there are differences, an 
endorsement analysis under Harris would be redundant and not terribly meaning-
ful. 
118 Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2656 (1992); see also Westside Commu-
nity Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 261 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring); 
Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist, 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 
112 S. Ct. 3020, reh'g denied, 977 F.2d 963, 966-68 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 
113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993). 
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1. Did the government direct the graduation prayer? 
In Weisman, the principal directed the graduation 
prayer. He decided to have a prayer, selected the Rabbi to 
give the prayer, and regulated the contents of the 
prayer. 119 In Harris, plaintiffs argued that the school dis-
trict and principal directed the prayer. The principal asked 
the student offering the prayer to put his prayers in writing 
and counseled him to be "sensitive."120 The principal also 
prepared and stored the voting ballots used by the se-
niors.121 Finally, the graduation program, which included 
references to the invocation and benediction, were printed in 
the newspaper at the principal's direction. 122 
However, the facts in Harris are distinguishable from 
those in Weisman. In Weisman the principal directed the 
graduation prayers. Whereas in Harris, the principal's in-
volvement is clearly incidental. She had no control over the 
contents of the invocation and benediction. Even if she tried 
to exercise some degree of influence by telling the student 
to write down his thoughts, following her advice was not a 
condition to his giving the prayer. In fact, he ignored her 
advice and gave the prayers the way he wanted. 123 
Although the principal prepared the ballots, she did not 
make the decision. The senior class voted by ballot and 
counted the votes. The decision of whether or not there 
would be invocations and benedictions at graduation rested 
in the hands of the senior class. They could have decided 
not to have the prayers as prior and subsequent classes 
did. 124 
Absolute separation is impossible. 125 Some relationship 
between government and religion is inevitable. The issue is 
119 Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2652-54. 
120 Plaintiffs Supplemental Mem. Supp. Injunction and Summ. J., at 3 (Apr. 
9, 1993). 
121 Reply, at 10. 
122 !d. 
123 Defendant's Supplemental Ba. Opp'n Summ. J., at 14 (Apr. 23, 1993). 
124 The senior class voted to have school prayer at 1991 graduation. In 1990, 
they chose to have a musical number as a benediction rather than a prayer. The 
Class of 1993 voted to have a moment of silence. 
125 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) (declaring that "[o]ur prior 
holdings do not call for total separation between church and state; total separation 
is not possible in an absolute sense .... [s]ome relationship between government 
and religious organizations is inevitable"); see also Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 
312 (1952). 
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whether the government has crossed the line from tolerance 
of religious activity to directing the religious exercise. In 
Harris, the school district had its agent, the principal, take 
a strictly neutral position. They did not make any decisions 
regarding the contents of the invocations or benedictions. 
The school encouraged voting by secret ballot to reduce the 
peer pressure associated with hand polls. If the vote had 
been by hand poll, without the presence of the principal, 
the minority would have been subject to a greater coercive 
force. Claims that preparing the ballots represent direction 
or endorsement by the school is attenuated at best. Encour-
aging such a process shows sensitivity to the issue. 
Once the students decided to have a graduation prayer, 
the district took a second step to ensure its neutrality. 
Since the students voted, the students had actual knowledge 
that they, not the district, decided to have the invocation 
and benediction. However, the district put a disclaimer in 
the program, which was published in the local newspaper, 
to cure any public misperception of official endorsement. 126 
2. Are invocations and benedictions formal religious 
exercises? 
Jones II is the only case on record that purports to 
analyze the question of whether offering an invocation or 
benediction is a formal religious exercise, but the attempt is 
rather superfluous. 127 The court never defines "formal reli-
gious exercise." It simply reiterates the logic of the govern-
ment-directs prong, and holds that the district's policy only 
tolerates and does not direct prayers. 128The school district 
126 Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 821 F.Supp. 638, 642 (D. Idaho 1993). 
The disclaimer states that: 
I d. 
[t]he Board of Trustees of Joint School District No. 241 neither promotes 
nor endorses any statements made by any person involved in the gradua-
tion ceremony. The District endorses each person's free exercise of speech 
and religion and any comments or statements made during the gradua-
tion ceremony should not be considered the opinions or beliefs of the 
District, the Board of Trustees or the Superintendent. 
127 Jones v. Clear Creek lndep. Sch. Dist, 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. 
granted, 112 S. Ct. 3020, reh'g denied, 977 F.2d 963, 971 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. 
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993). 
128 Jones, at 963 ("Lee directed Rabbi Gutterman to pray, and the Court 
Characterized this as a 'formal religious observance' . . . . By contrast, the Resolu-
tion tolerates nonsectarian, mit prayer, but does not require or favor it."). 
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in Harris followed this same reasoning by claiming that 
they simply tolerated and did not direct the prayer. 129 
However, unlike Jones II, the district court recognized the 
ambiguity of this prong. They raised concerns over how far 
the court would go in determining what is a formal reli-
gious exercise. 
Plaintiffs claimed that Harris is clearly distinguishable 
from Jones II due to the religious content of the prayer. 130 
Although prayers are normally considered religious, 131 this 
does not answer the question of whether such prayers con-
stitute a "formal religious exercise." Arguably, this case is 
distinguishable from Weisman since a student, not an or-
dained member of the clergy, gave the invocation. However, 
this distinction poses several new questions unanswered by 
Weisman. Do student prayers count as a "formal religious 
exercise?" Would student invocations count if they were 
nonsectarian and non-proselyting?132 There is no case law 
to support an argument either way. 
Theoretically, Establishment Clause cases could stand or 
fall on whether certain activities constitute "formal religious 
exercises." However, analyzing whether prayer constitutes a 
"formal religious exercise" creates such a quagmire that 
courts will probably focus on the other two coercion 
prongs. 133 
3. Are objectors obligated to participate? 
Harris implicitly argues that the students' age and the 
government's noninvolvement mitigate the coercive effect of 
the prayers. This approach is similar to Jones II. 134 The 
129 Defendant's Supplemental Ba. Opp'n Summ. J., at 17 (Apr. 23, 1993) 
("The School District in this case allows for prayer but wes not require or favor it 
given the record before this court which allows for non-prayer alternatives." (em-
phasis added)). 
130 Reply, at 4 ("In Jones v. Clear Creek, a student led invocation was al-
lowed, but the invocation was not a prayer and was nonsectarian and non-
proselytizing."). 
131 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
132 Plaintiffs seem to imply that such prayers would count. See Reply, at 4. 
133 See. e.g., Jones v. Clear Creek lndep. Sch. Dist, 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 
1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 3020, reh'g denied, 977 F.2d 963, 971 (5th Cir. 
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993); see generally Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. 
No. 241, 821 F. Supp. 638, 640-42 (D. Idaho 1993). 
134 See Jones II, 977 F.2d at 971. The court uses two arguments to mitigate 
the coercive effects of the prayers. First, less psychological pressure was placed on 
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Harris argument is supported by Westside Community Board 
of Education v. Mergens, which stated that 
there is a crucial difference between government speech 
endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, 
and private speech endorsing religion, which Free Speech 
and Free Exercise Clauses protect. We think that second-
ary school students are mature enough and are likely to 
understand that a school does not endorse or support 
students' speech that it merely permits on a nondiscrimi-
natory basis. 135 
This does not directly address the obligation to partici-
pate prong. In fact, this approach makes the participation 
prong dependant upon the government-directs prong. If the 
school directs the prayer, then the students' participation is 
essentially obligated. This argument is better placed with 
the government-directs prong and should be kept separate 
from the participation prong. The voluntary attendance argu-
ment would directly address the participation prong, but it 
did not survive Weisman. 136 
The argument that the students' age and maturity re-
duces coercion more directly addresses the participation 
prong. However, this argument has two major defects. First, 
age and maturity only move a case from sure failure to an 
area of uncertainty. Second, the Weisman Court specifically 
considered the age of students in determining the degree of 
coercion.137 The court specifically separated secondary stu-
the students because "after having participated in the decision of whether prayers 
will be given, [all students] are aware that any prayer represents the will of their 
peers, who are less able to coerce participation than an authority figure from the 
state or clergy." Id. (emphasis added). This argument will probably fail under the 
Supreme Court's reasoning since the Court claims "adolescents are often susceptible 
to pressure from their peers towards conformity and that the influence is strongest 
in matters of social convention." Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2659 (1992) 
(emphasis added). 
Second, the court considers the students' age is relevant as to whether the 
prayer will have a coercive effect. Graduating seniors are "less impressionable than 
younger students." Jones II, 977 F.2d at 971. 
Although there is validity to these arguments, Jones II focuses on the 
government's coercive involvement rather than on whether individuals are obligated 
to participate. 
135 Harris, 821 F. Supp. at 643 (quoting Westside Community Bd. of Educ. v. 
Mergens 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990)). 
136 Neither Harris nor Jones II argued voluntary attendance. 
137 Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2658-59, in which Justice Kennedy's majority 
opinion stated that: 
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dents as being more susceptible to pressure to partici-
pate. 138 Whether this means graduating seniors, most of 
whom are legally adults, are susceptible to pressure to par-
ticipate is not certain since Weisman involved a middle 
school, not a high school. 139 
Although not used in either the Jones II or Harris 
courts, a stronger argument is that students were not ob-
ligated to participate in the prayer. "No one in attendance 
at graduation at Grangerville High School in 1991 was 
asked to participate in the invocation [or the] benediction by 
standing, bowing their heads or removing their hats."140 If 
individuals did not actually participate, how can they claim 
coercion for something they did not do? Arguably, others 
around them may have bowed their heads, took off their 
hats, or folded their arms, which may have created an em-
barrassing environment when they did not act likewise. But 
does this constitute participation, if they did not follow the 
lead of those around them? The threshold is unclear. 141 
The participation prong seems to rest on the pressure to 
participate rather than on any actual participation. 
B. Lemon Applied to Harris 
Every graduation prayer case, except Weisman, used the 
Lemon test somewhere in its analysis. Although the test has 
Finding no violation under these circumstances would place objectors in 
the dilemma of participating, with all that implies, or protesting. We do 
not address whether that choice is acceptable if the affected citizens are 
mature adults, but we think the State may not, consistent with the Es-
tablishment Clause, place primary and secondary school children in this 
position. 
Weisman focuses on whether the students were coerced to participate, not on 
whether the adults were coerced. This implies that the coercion standard for the 
adults may be different. 
138 Id. But see Westside Community Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 
250 (1990)) (holding that secondary students are mature enough to understand that 
the school does not support or endorse other students' religious speech, but merely 
permits it). 
139 For example, the age deadline to start school in Idaho requires the child 
to be five years old by late August. This means that only the students whose 
birthdays fall in June, July, and early August will not be 18 by the time they 
graduate. 
140 Defendant's Statement of Facts, at 5 (Apr. 23 1993). 
141 In Weisman, standing during prayer and remaining respectfully silent 
were considered to be coercive. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2658. It is unclear whether 
remaining respectfully silent, by itself, constitutes participation. 
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been criticized as unworkable and impracticable, an analysis 
of the graduation prayer issue would not be complete with-
out it. To satisfy the Lemon test, graduation prayer must 
satisfy three prongs. The government practice must: (1) 
reflect a secular purpose; (2) have the primary effect of 
neither advancing nor inhibiting religion; and (3) avoid ex-
cessive governmental entanglement with religion. 142 
Most courts skim over the secular purpose prong very 
quickly. The issue is always the same and very simple. 
Does the activity have a secular purpose? Prayer serves the 
secular purpose of solemnizing a meeting or event. However 
prayer also has a religious purpose.143 Practically speaking, 
resolving this prong depends on how the court decides the 
primary effects prong. No graduation prayer case has failed 
the secular purpose prong after satisfying the primary ef-
fects prong. 144 Conversely, no case failing the primary ef-
fects prong has ever satisfied the secular purpose prong. 
This primary effects test prohibits the school district's 
policy, not the graduation prayers, from advancing or inhib-
iting religion. 145 For many courts this is the focus of their 
analysis. 146 In Harris, the school district's policy of remain-
ing strictly neutral on graduation prayers passes the prima-
ry effects test. 147 The strongest argument against neutral 
142 Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2654. 
143 No court in analyzing this prong has considered the dual nature of 
prayer. In various religions throughout the world, prayer means a variety of 
things. Prayer can serve both secular and religious purposes. For one person, 
prayer can solemnize the beginning of an important meeting; whereas, for another 
person, the same prayer will offer religious meaning. 
Christmas celebrations illustrate this duality. A, B, and C tell their boss, "I am 
going home to celebrate Christmas." For A this means presents, candy, and Santa 
Claus (a clause not found in the First Amendment). For B Christmas means read-
ing the story of Jesus and emulating him by sharing gifts with family, friends, and 
neighbors. For C Christmas means all of the above. 
Classifying invocations and benedictions as being purely secular or religious is 
overly simplistic. The words can mean different things to different people in the 
same audience. 
144 See, e.g., Lundberg v. West Monona Community Sch. Dist., 731 F. Supp. 
331, 342-345 (N.D. Iowa 1989); Graham v. Central Community Sch. Dist. of 
Decatur, 608 F. Supp. 531, 535-536 (S.D. Iowa 1985). 
145 Both Lundberg and Graham tend to focus on the religious nature of 
prayers, rather than if the school district sponsored or endorsed the prayers. See 
Lundberg, 731 F. Supp. at 343-44; Graham, 608 F. Supp. at 536. 
146 See, e.g., Lundberg, 731 F. Supp. at 343-45; Graham, 608 F. Supp. at 
536. 
147 See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist, 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991), 
cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 3020, reh'g denied, 977 F.2d 963, 964 n.1 (5th Cir. 1992), 
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policy is that allowing prayers creates ostensible official en-
dorsement problems. 148 The Harris facts mitigate ostensible 
endorsement with actual and constructive notice of no en-
dorsement. First, since the students voted, they had actual 
knowledge of who decided to have the prayers. 149 Second, 
the district gave constructive notice through a disclaimer on 
the program, which was previously printed in the newspa-
per. 150 Such notice should clear up public and student 
misperceptions about the district's policies towards gradua-
tion prayers. 
The excessive entanglement prong does not add much to 
the analysis above.151 The rabbi who wrote and delivered 
the prayers at the direction of the principal made this 
prong relevant to Weisman. However, in Harris the district's 
neutrality policy and having prayers given by students frees 
the district from all involvement with religious institu-
tions.152 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Court in Weisman could have banned all prayers at 
high school graduations. However, it chose not to do so. 
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993) (holding that the school district's policy of 
leaving graduation prayers to the students' discretion did not have the effect of 
endorsing or inhibiting religion). But see Lundberg, 721 F. Supp. at 335 (plaintiff 
suing to compel school board to include prayers at graduation); Graham, 608 F. 
Supp. at 533 (indicating that school board's decision to have prayers at commence-
ment had the effect of advancing religion). Note that prayers were upheld where 
the board was neutral, but not where the board was active. Since the school dis-
trict in Harris was neutral, it would likely pass the primary effects test. 
148 The litmus test for the primary effects prong is whether the activity 
"could be seen as lending the imprimatur of government to a particular view of 
religion." For example, printing a "motorist prayer" on an official state map violat-
ed the primary effects test under this litmus test. Graham, 608 F. Supp. at 536. 
149 Remember that the Court is concerned about the students, not the adults, 
being coerced by the school district. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S.Ct. 2649, 2658-59 
(1992). 
150 Harris, 821 F. Supp. at 2658-59. Constructive notice is supported by 
Westside Community Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 270 (1990) (Marshall 
& Brennan, JJ., concurring in the judgment). 
151 Plaintiffs in Graham and Lundberg never argued excessive entanglement. 
Accordingly, the courts never analyzed the issue; cf Rex E. Lee, The Religion 
Clauses: Problems and Prospects, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 340-42 (1986) (arguing 
for the :removal of the excessive entanglement prong). 
152 Cf Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist, 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991), 
cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 3020, reh'g denied, 977 F.2d 963, 968 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. 
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993). 
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Instead it preferred to reiterate the importance of line draw-
ing. Harris clearly is distinguishable from Weisman. The 
more important question is whether those distinctions allow 
Harris to be on the safe side of the Supreme Court's line. 
Harris does not use any of the pre-Weisman arguments 
that were struck down by the Court. Harris passes the coer-
cion and the Lemon tests promulgated by the Supreme 
Court. The key reasons it passed are the complete neutrali-
ty of the school district and the students' freedom to choose. 
Jones II, the only other case on record comparable to Har-
ris, supports this analysis and conclusion. Harris is a land-
mark case illustrating that graduation prayers are alive and 
well so long as graduating seniors have a real choice in de-
ciding whether to include prayers and who should give 
them. 
Robert Phillips 
